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COMMENTARY
German Council on Foreign Relations
Britain’s Reckoning 
with the Future
Brexit talks have entered extra time. 
If the UK is to leave the EU in an or-
derly manner, it needs a deal in the 
next four weeks. The trouble is that, 
as the prospect of leaving becomes 
more concrete, the government has 
finally recognized that it needs to 
honor the promises it has made to 
voters. Prime Minister Boris Johnson 
is struggling to reconcile his vague 
pledges with real world constraints – 
both internationally and domestically. 
Back in 2016, when he was a back-
bench MP during the referendum 
campaign, Boris Johnson set out an at-
tractive vision of Britain’s future out-
side the EU. In it, he made vague and 
rosy promises to voters, particularly to 
party supporters in the English heart-
lands, about the benefits of “taking 
back control.” After becoming prime 
minister in 2019, he continued in the 
same vein, presenting his Withdrawal 
Agreement as bringing benefits for all 
parts of the UK. 
But as Brexit negotiations draw to a 
close, Johnson is discovering just how 
hard it is to rectify his conf licting 
promises with one another let alone 
with international realities. On Sep-
tember 9, his government published 
its Internal Market Bill, which tries to 
square one such circle. While Johnson 
had previously pledged that there 
would be no customs border between 
Britain and Northern Ireland, this 
pledge has been exposed as a false-
hood. The inconsistency needs fixing, 
and there is no provision under EU law 
for London to do so unilaterally. 
In order to make good on the prime 
minister’s pledge, the UK plans to 
break its Withdrawal Agreement with 
the EU and international law besides. 
More worrying still: although this ma-
neuver is proving explosive in the EU, 
it appears to be merely a side issue 
for Johnson. He is far more interest-
ed in appeasing his constituents in En-
gland’s heartlands than unionists in 
Northern Ireland. Voters in England 
have forged their own clear and very 
diverse expectations of what Brexit 
should entail. They are now calling in 
the promises made.
WE’RE AGAINST, BUT 
WHAT ARE WE FOR?
During the 2016 referendum and 2019 
election campaigns, Boris Johnson suc-
ceeded in speaking to wildly different 
groups of voters: from entrepreneurs 
in England’s southeast to the disadvan-
taged in its northeast; from nostalgic 
advocates of an Anglosphere (a pro-
jected geopolitical grouping with the 
United States, Canada, New Zealand, 
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and Australia) to those with family 
links to “the Commonwealth” (today, 
shorthand for anglophone Africa and 
the Indian subcontinent).
This has left a difficult legacy. While 
“leave” united all those who could 
agree with the statement “the EU 
holds us back,” there are two differ-
ent faiths sitting in that broad church 
of malcontents. On the one hand, the 
people of the dilapidated industrial 
towns of the north feel held back by 
the EU’s restrictive stance on state aid. 
On the other, the golf-playing business 
executives of leafy southern England 
feel held back by the EU’s excessive 
protectionism. These two groups have 
very different ideas of post-Brexit 
policy.
Likewise, while all sorts of people 
could agree that the EU is an “anach-
ronism on the world stage,” two dis-
tinct understandings of its meaning 
have emerged. One group feels that 
the large border-free EU exposes it to 
threats brewing in the world’s unstable 
East and South. The other feels that 
the EU’s parochial internal market cuts 
it off from vibrant opportunities there. 
The two groups disagree on wheth-
er the UK should forge relations with, 
say, China, especially if the United 
States cuts it adrift.
THE RIGHT HONORABLE  
BORIS JOHNSON
Since negotiations on the future EU-
UK relationship began in January, 
Johnson has been desperately trying 
to avoid alienating any part of his fan 
base. Although the EU demanded clari-
ty on issues such as the UK’s intentions 
for state aid, he refused to respond. 
Johnson made a virtue of his indeci-
sion, weaponizing the ambiguity in or-
der to unsettle Brussels. As recently 
as a fortnight ago, most observers be-
lieved talks would end with Johnson 
still playing chicken with himself.
But then Europe woke up to find a dif-
ferent kind of prime minister. Gone 
was indecisive Boris “two op-eds” 
Johnson, the man who, in February 
2016, notoriously drafted two alterna-
tive newspaper articles, one express-
ing ardent support for Vote Leave, the 
other committing to Remain. In his 
stead sat a politician so committed to 
his agenda that he would burn bridges 
for it. Whereas the early stages of the 
negotiations were defined by Johnson’s 
lack of scruples, the end phase is being 
determined by his sense of honor.
The prime minister has not, in fact, 
undergone a character change. While 
Johnson certainly deserves his reputa-
tion for misleading voters, it is worth 
remembering that he did so because 
he wants to be popular. This desire to 
be liked by voters constitutes a vis-
ceral form of political accountability. 
Booed on the streets of London in 2016 
for running a dishonest Brexit cam-
paign, Johnson pitched his bid for the 
premiership on the grounds that only 
he could redeem his contradictory 
promises. 
APPEALING TO ALL 
ENGLISH CAMPS
Still, it is becoming clear that we have 
merely seen the return of a familiar 
old character from the Brexit multi-
verse: Boris “I want to have my cake 
and eat it, too” Johnson. Johnson’s as-
sertive new policy marks a commit-
ment to, well, all sides. It appeals to the 
weak and the strong, the opportunists 
and pessimists. Thus, when it comes 
to domestic affairs, Johnson will ag-
gressively use the escape from the EU 
to deploy state aid to his supporters 
working in struggling industries. He 
will not keep weak old industrial towns 
on life support though, but rather 
transform them into tech hubs of the 
kind beloved by his business-friendly 
supporters.  
This domestic agenda bears the fin-
gerprints of Johnson’s chief advisor, 
Dominic Cummings. If it had a slo-
gan, it would echo the “Laptops and 
Lederhosen” approach of rural Ba-
varia. It is complemented by a glob-
al agenda seemingly inspired by Tony 
Abbott, who was appointed trade ad-
viser last week. Abbott’s slogan could 
be summed up as “Coal and China.” In-
deed, Australia’s ex-prime minister is 
being sold as the man who protected 
traditional industries while grabbing 
economic opportunities in the East. 
To realize this broad new agenda, 
Johnson will need the EU and its mem-
ber states to make considerable con-
cessions. Yet his opening salvo has 
alienated leaders in Brussels, who have 
reminded the British of their duty to 
the rule of law and basic fair play. He 
has disquieted member states, too. The 
UK’s traditional allies in the east had 
been watching the parallel UK Defense 
Review with concern, unable to tell 
whether the UK was engaged in mod-
ernization or a retreat from its inter-
national obligations. The answer now 
seems clear: both. 
FORTUNE DOES NOT  
ALWAYS FAVOR THE BOLD
Might the UK’s chutzpah neverthe-
less play out in its favor? On big ticket 
items like trade, the Commission is 
firmly in charge, and it will likely carry 
on as before. Still, a smaller field such 
as EU internal security cooperation 
could be ripe for Britain’s snatch and 
grab policy. It has long been speculat-
ed that the UK is interested in a “mini-
deal” with selected members – quick 
and dirty access to its pick of EU secu-
rity databases without the oversight of 
EU institutions. The UK’s interior min-
ister, Home Secretary Priti Patel, is due 
to meet a small group of her EU coun-
terparts next week. 
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If British opportunism will work any-
where, then in that field. Sub-groups 
of European states do still club to-
gether to forge ahead without the 
EU scaffolding, and they are looking 
to do so in precisely the fields which 
preoccupy Cummings: the manage-
ment of largescale databases and the 
harvesting and exchange of personal 
data. These sub-groups are also seek-
ing novel ways to handle matters on 
which Abbott is focusing, for example 
the undermining of Western standards 
by autocratic states such as Russia, 
Turkey, and China. 
But while Britain’s diplomatic pyro-
technics may have shaken these sub-
groups, it has not made cooperation 
any easier. The great weakness of the 
EU’s data regime is fragmentation, 
meaning any new project would need 
to link up the full range of databas-
es. Its great strength – at least when it 
comes to Turkey, Russia, and China – is 
its oversight by liberal EU institutions. 
The UK discounts itself from both. It 
is confirmation that the British gov-
ernment is not so much trying to build 
international relationships as it is to 
clear obstacles to its national agenda.
GHOSTS OF BRITAIN’S  
FUTURE
As the government’s agenda crystalliz-
es, it is becoming clear that it is more 
than an attempt to keep opposing 
camps happy. While Johnson’s advisors 
acknowledge that strange bedfellows 
voted for Brexit, they do not ascribe 
their support to ignorance of the im-
plications or to Johnson’s loose prom-
ises. Instead, they believe it reflects the 
times: Britain finds itself poised be-
tween international success and ca-
tastrophe. Very different groups feel 
this acutely, and very different groups 
understood that leaving the EU was key.
Johnson’s advisors are drawing a par-
allel to an earlier period of British his-
tory. They recall the early phase of the 
empire in the 1590s, when a poor but 
opportunistic England was able to pick 
apart the pompous empires of the In-
dian Subcontinent, devouring all but 
their most cohesive parts. They believe 
Britain has an opportunity to return to 
that opportunistic phase, but it might 
be gobbled up by bigger powers if it 
stays locked into EU institutions. 
So how does the UK grab global op-
portunities and avoid being devoured 
by China or India? History has an an-
swer: be piratical. Avoid making com-
mitments to status quo powers like the 
EU. Avoid holding territory, even the 
remnants of England’s “first empire,” 
Northern Ireland and Scotland. Build 
the capacity to master the high seas 
of the modern era, the virtual realm. 
Mixed into this is the impish desire to 
singe the beard of big continental em-
pires – notably, today’s Universal Mon-
archy, the EU. 
Europeans have generally chalked up 
the United Kingdom’s decision to leave 
the EU to nostalgia for a time when 
Britain “ruled the waves.” They would 
do well to revise this idea. It is, in fact, 
Europeans who are waxing nostalgic 
for the positive legacy of Britain’s pe-
riod of high empire – its liberal inter-
nationalism, global responsibility, and 
sense of fair play. Today’s UK is pursu-
ing a darker ghost of empire. This pi-
ratical old Britain will “waive the rules.”
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